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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans cet article, nous étudions la dynamique des choix d'habitation des personnes âgées en 
manque d'autonomie. En utilisant les données provenant du Panel Study of Income Dyamics 
et de son Parental Health Supplement, nous sommes en mesure de reconstruire l'historique 
complet des choix d'habitation de ces individus. La méthodologie utilisée pour tenir compte 
de l'impact des caractéristiques démographiques, de l'état de la santé et de la situation 
financière des personnes âgées sur leur choix d'habitation consiste en une série de modèles de 
risques concurrents à effets aléatoires simultanés. Cette méthodologie permet aussi de tenir 
compte de la dépendance à la durée et à l'état ainsi que de l'hétérogénéité non-observée. Nous 
trouvons que ces derniers phénomènes sont très importants pour prédire le mode d'habitation 
choisi par ce segment de la population. 
 
Mots clés : Dynamique des choix d'habitation, risques concurrents, modèle 
markovien, hétérogénéité non-observée, vieillissement des populations. 
 
 
 
In this paper, we address the dynamics associated with living-arrangement decisions of sick, 
elderly individuals. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and its Parental 
Health Supplement, we construct the complete living-arrangement histories of elderly 
individuals in need of care. We use a simultaneous random-effects competing-risks model to 
analyze the impact of demographic characteristics, health and wealth on the living-
arrangement decisions of sick elderly individuals while taking into account state and duration 
dependence as well as unobserved heterogeneity. We find that state and duration dependence 
serve as important predictors for the living arrangement choices of sick elderly individuals. 
 
Keywords: Living arrangement dynamics, competing risks, markov models, 
unobserved heterogeneity, aging. 
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1 Introduction
The demographic trend of an increasing elderly population, both in absolute and relative terms,
has put considerable upward pressure on medical and long-term-care expenditures. Although many
sick elderly individuals rely on nursing-home and formal in-home care, most rely on informal care
provided by family members, including spouses and children.1 Not surprisingly, a growing body of
literature has examined the factors that aﬀect the mode-of-care and living-arrangement decisions.
More specifically, many studies have examined the role of family composition, health/disability,
income and wealth, as well as family bargaining on the living-arrangement decisions of sick elderly
individuals, i.e. on the decision to live independently (with or without a spouse), cohabit with a
family member, or move into a nursing home.2
The literature, however, has generally ignored the long-term dynamics within and across dif-
ferent living arrangements by modelling (implicitly or explicitly) the living-arrangement decisions
as once-and-for-all, or, as a series of decisions which are made independently from one another;
this in spite of the fact that sick elderly individuals often experience more than one type of living
arrangement.3 Furthermore, prior living arrangements, as well as their lengths, likely influence fu-
ture living-arrangement choices. For example, simple examination of the transition histories show
that sick elderly individuals often follow a cohabiting living arrangement with a nursing home stay.
Thus, treating diﬀerent living arrangements as simple substitutes without examining the dynamics
between them is omitting a potentially important element.
In this paper, we address the dynamics associated with living-arrangement decisions of sick
1A fact highlighted in many studies including Stoller (1983), White-Means (1992) Kotlikoﬀ and Morris (1990),
and Börsch-Supan, Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ and Morris (1991).
2See for example Greenberg and Ginn (1979), Branch and Jett (1982), Cohen, Telland and Wallack (1986), Garber
and MaCurdy (1989), Börsch-Supan, Kotlikoﬀ and Morris (1991) Stern (1995), Pezzin and Schone (1999) Hidemann
and Stern (1999), and Engers and Stern (2002).
3Heiss, Hurd and Börsch-Supan (2003) examine the relationship between living arrangements, health and economic
status. However, their approach which estimates transition probabilities can not control for unobserved heterogeneity
and duration dependence. Their approach also assumes that outcome probabilities of the state variables are condition-
ally independent. Finally, because the initial sample contained non-institutionalized elderly individuals exclusively,
transitions into and out of nursing homes are limited.
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elderly individuals. We first construct complete living-arrangement histories using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Parental Health Supplement (PHS) on elderly individuals in
need of care. We then formulate an explicit model of the living-arrangement transitions’ generating
process. Because the model must account for living-arrangement states at every moment in time,
and because transitions can occur at any time, we use a simultaneous random-eﬀects competing-
risks model. Transition intensities are modelled in a very flexible manner with respect to the
baseline hazard using the Gompertz distribution for durations in each state. Finally, since we
observe an individual through multiple living arrangements, we control for individual unobserved
heterogeneity assuming stochastic variation in the transition rates.
Our econometric framework allows us to simultaneously estimate state-specific duration depen-
dence which provides information on the stability of each living arrangement; something that has,
to our knowledge, not been done before. If duration dependence is an important element in the
living-arrangement decisions of sick elderly individuals, then public policies may be more eﬀective
if they are developed accordingly. We are also able to verify whether or not previous results with
respect to the impact of demographic, income and health factors on living-arrangement decisions
are robust to duration dependence, unobserved heterogeneity and the competing risks of transitions
into other types of living arrangements, death or censoring.
Results presented below underscore, among other things, the importance of age, state and
duration dependence in the living-arrangement decisions of sick elderly parents. For example,
we show that although individuals are more likely to transit out of cohabitation as they grow
older, they are less likely to transit back to independent living as the time spent in cohabitation
increases. Furthermore, transitions out of nursing home exhibit negative duration dependence for
both transitions to independent living and cohabitation. That is, individuals are less and less likely
to ever exit a nursing home as the time spent in such a living arrangement increases. Results such
as these suggest that public policies may be more eﬀective if they are targeted towards particular
individuals. For example, a policy which seeks to encourage the de-institutionalization of elderly
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individuals in favor of alternate forms of care (such as cohabitation) may be more eﬀective if it is
targeted at elderly individuals in the early periods of their nursing-home stay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present details of the data
set and summary statistics on living-arrangement transitions and durations. In section 3 we develop
the econometric model. Results are presented in section 4. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics’ Parental Health
Supplement of 1991. In 1988, PSID households were asked some basic questions about their parents
(living and/or deceased). This initial information formed the basis of the Parental Health Supple-
ment which was administered to PSID households in 1991. Eligibility for the PHS required that
the parent of the PSID Head of household (or spouse): (i) was 70 years of age or older in 1991, or
(ii) had died after 1980 at 70 years of age or older (in the case of a deceased parent). The PHS
includes 1,650 eligible ‘fathers’ and 2,008 eligible ‘mothers’.4
In an attempt to identify parents who were in need of care/assistance, the PSID head of house-
hold (and spouse) was asked if their parent(s) had reached the point where they could no longer be
expected to live independently and take care of their own daily needs without extra help, at any
time between 1975 and 1991 (we henceforth refer to the time when the parent reached such a point
as the parent’s ‘time-of-illness’). For 1,650 eligible fathers, 431 of their children identified them as
having reached such a needs threshold at 60 years of age or older. Similarly, the children of 588 of
2,008 eligible mothers identified them as having reached such a needs threshold at 60 years of age
or older. These 1,019 individuals constitute the sample we use for the remainder of the paper.
If a parent had reached such a ‘needs’ threshold, a retrospective questionnaire was administered
to the adult child about each parent (we henceforth refer to these parents as ‘sick elderly individ-
4Fathers may either be the PSID Head of household’s father or the spouse’s father. Similarly, mothers may either
be the PSID Head of household’s mother or the spouse’s mother. Thus, each PSID family may have at most 4
parents who qualify for the Parental Health Supplement.
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uals’). Information was collected about: (i) whether the parent suﬀered from a series of particular
illnesses; (ii) whether the parent was able to perform a series of basic tasks; (iii) where the parent
resided (and for how long); (iv) how many living children the parent had; (v) parental home own-
ership; and (vi) parental age and marital-status. This information was collected for various points
in time during the parent’s history. Because dates were given for each parent’s transition from one
type of living arrangement to another (as well as information collected about the parent and his
or her family at the time of each transition), we are able to construct the full living-arrangement
history of each parent up to their death or up to 1991.5 ,6 As a result, the PHS lends itself well to
both the analysis of parental living-arrangement decisions as well as their durations.
As in the previous literature, we focus on 3 diﬀerent types of living arrangements: (i) independent
living with or without a spouse7; (ii) cohabiting with a family member (for example, with a child
or child-in-law); and (iii) living in a nursing home. Summary statistics on the living-arrangements
at the time-of-illness for fathers and mothers (including information on their lengths) are presented
in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. At the time-of-illness, 24.6 per cent of fathers entered a nursing
home, 22.3 per cent of fathers moved-in with a child (cohabitation), while 42 per cent of fathers
remained in independent living.8 Although some fathers remain in these living arrangements until
their death (or until they are censored in 1991), many others experience subsequent transitions into
other types of living arrangements. The full living-arrangement histories of fathers are summarized
in Figure 1.
Mothers in the PHS appear to behave diﬀerently from fathers. For example, of the mothers
5Although recall based survey data may often exhibit measurement error, studies have shown that the accuracy of
such data is good for important events such as marital, fertility and major employment episodes (Dex, 1991). Given
that the survey questions in our data set are centered around major events (i.e., living-arrangement transitions of
elderly parents), recall is unlikely to be an important issue.
6Of the 431 fathers ‘in-need’, 308 had died prior to, or in, 1991. As a result, we observe the full living-arrangement
history of 70 per cent of the fathers in our sample; the rest being censored in 1991. Similarly, 55 per cent of mothers
‘in-need’ have complete living-arrangement histories; the rest being censored.
7 In this type of living arrangement, some received formal in-home care, while other received informal in-home care
provided by family and friends including spouses and children.
8The rest of the fathers (10,9 per cent) entered a hospital at the time of illness, where they remained until their
death or until 1991. We exclude hospital stays as a type of living arrangement in our econometric analysis below.
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in-need, 31.3 per cent entered a nursing home (compared to 24.3 per cent of fathers) at the time-
of-illness. This somewhat larger proportion may be partially due to the fact that women often
outlive their spouse and are thus unable to benefit from a potentially important source of care.
Furthermore, 37.9 per cent of mothers moved in with someone (cohabit) at the time-of-illness,
while 24.4 per cent of mothers remained in independent living at that time.9 Again, the fact that
mothers appear to rely more heavily on cohabitation and are less likely to remain independent may
be due to the lack of a healthy/living spouse for caregiving. The full-living arrangement histories
of mothers are summarized in Figure 2.
Another important element in the above figures is the percentage of individuals who transit out
of an initial living arrangement. For example, in our sample, 13 per cent of fathers and 10.3 per cent
of mothers are observed transiting out of an initial nursing-home stay. It is, however, important
to note that a large proportion of both fathers and mothers are censored in nursing-home care,
i.e., we do not observe whether or not they ultimately transit out of nursing-home care. Thus the
percentage of actual transitions out of an initial nursing-home stay is likely to be greater. Transitions
out of an initial cohabiting or independent living arrangement are, not surprisingly, more common.
For example, 24 per cent of fathers and 20.4 per cent of mothers are observed transiting out of an
initial cohabiting stay. Consequently, even in the presence of censoring, a considerable percentage of
individuals transit out of their initial living arrangement. Another important element that should
be highlighted in these figures is the means by which individuals ultimately end up in a particular
living arrangement. For example, many individuals enter a nursing home via cohabitation. As a
result, cohabitation may serve both as a substitute and a lead-in to institutionalization. These
initial results not only indicate that living-arrangement decisions may be made more than once but
also suggest that they are not independently made from one another.
Duration data (presented in Tables 1 and 2) show that mothers experience considerably longer
96.9 per cent of the mothers entered a hospital at the time illness, where they remained until their death or until
1991.
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lengths of stays across all types of living arrangements. For example, if we compare the three
diﬀerent living arrangements (excluding hospital stays) for mothers and fathers who died in their
first living arrangement, we find that mothers have a much longer average length of stay - in nursing
home (1,265 days compared to 897); cohabitation (1,414 days compared to 761.9); and independent
living (1,645 days compared to 973). Women may have longer nursing-home and cohabiting stays
because they live longer and are more likely to outlive their spouse (or because male spouses may be
less able or willing to care for their ailing wives). They might also have longer independent-living
durations because they are better able to care for themselves without the full time use of informal
and formal care.
Table 3 provides labels for variables (covariates) that are used in our analysis while Table 4
presents summary statistics for these covariates by transition types, i.e., for each possible type of
exit. As is apparent, the mean value for a given covariate varies greatly by transition type. To
cite just one example, elderly parents who transit from independent living to cohabitation, have
on average more children than those who remain in independent living, yet have less children than
those who transit from independent living to nursing home. Because the role of covariates appears
to be transition-type specific (i.e., entry-exit pair specific), we adopt an econometric model that
takes into account the diﬀerent types of transitions in order to model the living-arrangement choices
correctly.
3 Econometric Specification
In order to analyze the impact of demographic characteristics, wealth, health, unobserved hetero-
geneity and duration dependence on the living-arrangement decisions of the sick elderly, we use a
simultaneous random-eﬀects competing-risks model.10 We extend the basic duration model to a
competing-risks framework to take into account multiple types of transitions (transitions from one
10Another option would be to use a structural dynamic programming approach.
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particular type of living arrangement to another type of living arrangement, death or censoring).11
Because we observe the complete living-arrangement histories, we estimate a competing-risks model
for each possible state. Simultaneity between the competing-risks models is achieved by including
an individual-specific random-eﬀects component that also takes into account unobserved hetero-
geneity. We use likelihood based methods to estimate the model by making assumptions about the
probability density function of duration within each state and about the random eﬀects.
This simultaneous random-eﬀects competing-risks model can be interpreted as a finite-state
continuous-time Markov model (Lancaster (1990)). To see this, let Y (t) represent the state of the
individual at time t. Y (t) can take 4 values : (1) living in a nursing home, (2) living independently
(3) cohabiting, and (4) death. Transitions between states are determined by a matrix of transition
intensities. That is, given that state b (b ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is entered at calendar time t and is still
occupied at t+ s, the transition out of b is determined by the set of 3 transition intensities hbe(t, s)
(where e ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and e 6= b). As a consequence, hbe(t, s)ds gives the probability of a departure
from state b to state e in the short interval from t+ s to t+ s+ ds. This probability is conditional
on occupation of b for s and on the previous transition history. It is also conditional on the level
and time paths of regressor vectors to t + s. The matrix of transition intensities between the 4
states takes the form 

1− h1 h12 h13 h14
h21 1− h2 h23 h24
h31 h32 1− h3 h34
0 0 0 1

 (1)
where we define
hb(t) =
X
b 6= e
e
hbe(t) (2)
to be the probability of exiting state b. This decomposition allows us to not only study the factors
determining the length of stay in a particular living arrangement but also compare the diﬀerent
11See Crowder (2001) for a general treatment of competing-risks models or Dolton and van der Klaauw (2001) and
Maelli and Pudney (1996) for detailed recent examples.
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factors behind diﬀerent types of exits.12
To build the likelihood function, we assume the that probability density function of the time
spent in each living arrangement takes the generalized Gompertz form. We choose the generalized
form for two reasons. First, it allows for piecewise-linear duration splines in the baseline hazard.
As a result, we do not make any assumptions about the form of duration dependence present in
our data. Second, the Gompertz distribution gives rise to a very convenient form for the hazard
rates or transition intensities : the log-hazards are linear in the covariates of interest.13
Specifically, we let the transition from living arrangement b to living arrangement e take the
following form:
lnhibe(t|xi, zit) = γbe0 timet + γb1ageit + βbe0 + βbe1 xi + βbe2 zit, b, e = 1, 2, ..., 4, b 6= e (3)
where the vector xi includes person-specific variables such as gender and the vector zit includes time-
varying spell-specific variables such as health or marital status. As noted previously, a complete
description of the variables included in the econometric analysis is provided in Table 3.
It is important to note that the hazard incorporates two diﬀerent types of duration dependence:
age and living-arrangement duration dependence. These two eﬀects are separately identifiable
because the duration clock is reset to zero after a transition whereas the age clock is not. In both
12One could interpret each line of the transition matrix as describing a competing-risk model where there is a
number of latent survival times, one for each destinations, and the actual destination observed is the minimum of the
latent survial times.
13We say that t follows the Gompertz distribution when its density function takes the form:
f(t) = e(λ+γt)−
eλ
γ (e
γt−1)
The survivor function is
S(t) = e
−eλ
γ (e
γt−1)
and the hazard rate is written as
h(t) = eλeγt
or
lnh(t) = λ+ γt
The model is implemented by parametrizing λ = βX. Thus, in its most basic form, we write a Gompertz hazard as
lnh(t) = γT (t) + βX
9
cases, we use a piecewise-linear splines to allow for the most general form of duration dependence
possible. For a duration spline T (s) with P nodes, we have
T (s) =


min[s, p1]
max[0,min[s− p1, p2 − p1]]
...
max[0,min[s− pP−1, pP − pP−1]]
max[0, s− pP ]


(4)
where p1, ..., pP represent the nodes. To identify the nodes, we first divide each duration into
separate time intervals of equal length and estimate separate duration-dependence coeﬃcients for
each interval. When two duration-dependence estimates are equal to each other, we merge the two
time intervals. Although theoretically possible, we do not add calendar time to our model as we
do not observe enough transitions to diﬀerentiate its impact from the impact of age. It would also
be possible to let the impact of age diﬀer across transition types. However, estimation results do
not reject the hypothesis that γbe1 = γ
b
1,∀e. As a result, we henceforth assume γbe1 = γb1,∀e.
Then, if we observe a sick elderly individual i through Ci cycles (Ci = 2 or 3), his or her
contribution to the log likelihood will be
Li =
CiX
c=1
3X
b=1
4X
e=1
db
£
mie log h
i
be(t
i)− Λb(ti)
¤
, (5)
where the integrated hazard takes the familiar form
Λb(t) =
Z t
0
X
e
b 6=e
hbe(t)dt; b, e = 1, 2, ..., 4, b 6= e (6)
and where the two sets of binary indicators are defined as follow
db =
½
1 if b is entered at the beginning of the cycle
0 otherwise
me =
½
1 if e is occupied at the end of the cycle
0 otherwise
.
For a censored observation, de = 0, e = 1, ..., 4. Hence its contribution to the likelihood is simply
exp(−Λb(t)). (7)
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Note that some transition intensities may be identically zero (i.e. transitions out of absorbing
states). We next discuss two potential issues that must be addressed when estimating these types
of duration models.
(i) Initial conditions Usually, the likelihood function is conditional on the initial state and
on the state history prior to the start of the observation. However, there is no initial conditions
problem in our data as everyone begins in independent living.
(ii) Unobserved heterogeneity In order to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity,
we assume that the hazard rate depends on a random person-specific eﬀect θi (where θi can be
interpreted as a person-specific taste for change). Consequently, we rewrite the conditional hazard
as
lnhibe(t|xi, zit) = γbe0 timet + γb1ageit + βbe0 + βbe1 xi + βbe2 zit + θi, b, e = 1, 2, ..., 4, b 6= e. (8)
We assume θi to be distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σθ. Thus, θi is independent of
the values of any regressor at that time. We identify the variance (σθ) through the observation of
the same individual across multiple types of living arrangements. The likelihood function is built in
the same manner as before. Estimation is done by maximizing the marginal likelihood, integrating
out the heterogeneity components θi:
Li(γ, β, σθ | timet, ageit, xi, zit) =
Z +∞
−∞
CiY
c=1
L(γ, β, σθ | timet, ageit, xi, zit, θi)f(θi)dθ. (9)
We use Gauss-Hermite Quadrature to approximate the normal integral.
4 Results
Results with respect to coeﬃcients describing the living arrangement dynamics are summarized in
Tables 5 and 6. Table 7, which is divided into 3 parts, presents coeﬃcients for other covariates of in-
terest for transitions out of independence, cohabitation and nursing home, respectively. Because we
11
find unobserved heterogeneity to be significant (σθ = 1.21 with a standard error of 0.11), all tables
include results without (column “Base”) and with (column “Mixed”) unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1 Transitions out of Independence
We first examine estimation results for elderly individuals whose current living arrangement is
independent living. In the first row of Table 5, we find that growing older significantly and positively
aﬀects the risk of transiting out of independent living; the eﬀect being considerably greater once we
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Estimates for duration dependence (presented in Table 6) also
increase in magnitude once unobserved heterogeneity has been accounted for. These results suggest
that duration dependence is negative across all destination states, i.e., individuals are less likely to
transit out of independent living as the length of stay increases. Negative duration dependence may
be due to an increased emotional attachment to this form of living arrangement.14 Furthermore,
the fact that the magnitude of duration dependence is similar across all destination states suggests
that duration is not a factor in determining whether a sick elderly individual transits into a nursing
home or cohabitation.
Turning to the first part of Table 7, we find that being female increases the transition intensity
associated with moving into a nursing home. This is not surprising given that women often outlive
their spouse. Furthermore, it is likely that males are less able to care for their ailing wives than
are women able to care for their ailing husbands (because of caregiving capital accumulation).
Mothers also have a greater transition intensity associated with moving from an independent living
arrangement to cohabitation. This result may reflect the relatively greater ability of mothers at
providing ‘home-making’ services to the family unit such as caring for grandchildren.
Estimates also suggest that having more children increases the transition intensity associated
with cohabitation. This is likely because: (i) parents with many children have a greater probability
of finding a child who is able/willing to take care of and move-in with them; and/or (ii) larger
14For the purpose of estimation, we assume individuals become at risk of transiting into diﬀerent living arrangements
at 50 years of age. In fact, the first transition observed in our data set occurs at 51 years old.
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families are better able to share caregiving responsibilities by reducing the burden imposed on each
caregiver. Furthermore, being married increases the transition intensity associated with moving
from an independent living arrangement into a nursing home. Although this may seem surprising
at first, it is important to note that this does not imply that individuals are more likely to end up
in a nursing home if they are married given that married individuals are much less likely to transit
into a nursing home if they are cohabiting. Thus, even if the probability of being in nursing home
is negatively correlated with being married, it does not necessarily imply that married individuals
are less at risk of transiting from an independent living arrangement into a nursing home.
Examining the coeﬃcients for health indicators, we notice, as expected, that having diﬃculties
with thinking, concentrating and memory or having experienced a stroke increases the transition
intensity associated with a move from an independent living arrangement into a nursing home.
Also, having diﬃculties hearing or suﬀering from angina decreases the same transition intensity.
Home ownership, however, reduces this transition intensity (again, consistent with prior studies).
This last result may capture several eﬀects including: (i) an income eﬀect, (ii) an inherent ability
to take care of oneself, and/or (iii) an attachment to the current place of residence.
4.2 Transitions out of Cohabitation
With respect to elderly parents in need of care who are currently in cohabitation, we again find
positive age duration , i.e., as individuals get older they are more likely to transit out of a cohabiting
stay (see Table 5)15. However, results from Table 6 suggest a rather diﬀerent dynamic for transitions
out of cohabitation than for transitions out of independent living. In fact, our results suggest that
individuals are much less likely to return to independent living as the length of their cohabiting
stay increases (while more likely to transit to nursing home or death). This result suggests that
independent living is a very unlikely exit route for individuals who cohabit, especially as time
goes by. This negative duration dependence may reflect a parent’s growing dependency on informal
15The age duration eﬀect is again much larger once we control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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family care or the increased fixed costs associated with returning to independent living (for example,
as time goes by, it is more likely that the parent’s home and other personal items will have been
sold).
We also find in Table 7 that sick elderly mothers who cohabit (relative to sick elderly fathers
who cohabit) are less at risk of transiting into nursing-home care as well as less at risk of dying (the
transition intensity from cohabitation into independent living is not statistically diﬀerent for men
and women). Thus, estimates indicate that durations in shared living arrangements (cohabitation)
are likely to be longer for women than they are for men. Part of the reason that cohabiting stays
may be more stable for mothers than for fathers may be their ability in providing home-making
services such as caring for grandchildren.
Results also indicate that having more children decreases the cohabitation-into-independent-
living transition intensity. This result likely reflects the ability of larger families to care for their
sick elderly parents in a shared living arrangement. Being married appears to reduce the transition
intensity from cohabitation into nursing home. Results also indicate that suﬀering from heart or
kidney disease or having problems seeing decreases the transition intensity associated with moving
from cohabitation into a nursing home.
The negative duration dependence associated with transiting back into independent living from
a cohabiting spell suggests the need to target policies. By encouraging, for example, individuals
to remain in shared living arrangements (i.e., cohabitation), especially during the early periods,
policies may ultimately serve to delay and reduce institutionalization.
4.3 Transitions out of Nursing Homes
Results also indicate that elderly parents in need of care are more likely to transit out of nursing
home (for all states) as they grow older (γnh1 = 0.13 in Table 5). In stark contrast to transitions out
of cohabitation, transitions out of nursing homes exhibit negative duration dependence for both
transitions to independent living and cohabitation. Moreover, duration dependence for re-entry into
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independent living is also greater for individuals in nursing homes relative to cohabitation. These
two results are consistent with financial and psychic costs associated with re-entry into independent
living or cohabitation; costs which are likely to increase as time spent in a nursing home goes by.
It is worth contrasting duration-dependence coeﬃcients (provided in Table 6) for transitions
from nursing home to cohabitation (which are significantly negative in both specification) to those
for transitions from cohabitation to nursing homes (which are significantly diﬀerent from zero).
These results underline the role of cohabitation as an important transitory living arrangement
between independence and nursing-home care
Table 7 show that being married increases the likelihood of transiting from a nursing home
care back into independent living. Furthermore, elderly individuals are less likely to return to
independent living but more likely to transit into cohabitation, as the number of children increases.
These results again underscore the importance of informal caregivers in avoiding nursing home
stays.
Turning to health indicators, we find that having problems thinking, concentrating and with
memory increases the transition intensity associated with moving out of a nursing home into an
independent living arrangement. Furthermore, having problems seeing decreases the transition
intensity associated with moving from a nursing home into cohabitation.
The eﬀect of duration dependence is particularly important when formulating policies which seek
to reduce institutionalization. As noted above, individuals are much less likely to ever transit out of
a nursing home (either towards independent living or cohabitation) as the length of their nursing-
home stay increases. Thus, policies which seek to encourage the re-entry of institutionalized elderly
individuals into the community would appear to be more eﬀective if they were targeted towards
individuals at the early stages of their institutionalization.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the living-arrangement dynamics of elderly individuals in need of care
in a dynamic setting. Because elderly individuals often experience more than one type of liv-
ing arrangements and that current living arrangements (as well as their lengths) likely influence
future ones, we estimate a model which allows for such dynamic features. More specifically, we
estimate a simultaneous random-eﬀects competing-risks model which also controls for unobserved
heterogeneity.
By using the full living arrangement history of elderly parents in need of care, we find that
state, age and duration dependence are important. For example, we find that the likelihood that
an individual transits into a nursing home is dependent on whether an individual is currently in
a shared living arrangement (cohabitation) or in independent living as well as the length of time
spent in either of these living arrangements. Furthermore, we find that cohabitation may serve
as an important barrier to ever transiting into a nursing home. Our results also indicate that
cohabiting with a child may be a more eﬀective substitute for nursing home care for women than
it is for men (i.e., the risk of transiting from cohabitation to nursing home is smaller for mothers
than it is for fathers).
Overall, our approach and results present a more complex picture of the living-arrangement
decisions of sick elderly individuals than previous work based primarily on cross-sectional analysis.
Furthermore, applying the same methodology to longitudinal data on aging would be interesting
once these panels contain enough years to build the full living arrangement histories. Although
we focus on sick elderly individuals with children (an important sub-population from a policy
perspective), more complete data would allow us to broaden our analysis to the general elderly
population.
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Table 1: Fathers
Living Arrangement Per cent Min Max Average
1) Hospital Stay† 10.9%
Censored 6.4% (of 10.9%) 210 300 240
Died There 93.6% (of 10.9%) 0‡ 2040 491.6
2) Nursing Home 24.6%
Censored 28,3% (of 24.6%) 30 510 250.3
Died There 55.7% (of 24.6%) 0 2790 897.8
Transited 13% (of 26.2%) 9 1825 268.5
3) Cohabitation 22.3%
Censored 28.1% (of 22.3%) 30 450 236.7
Died There 47.9% (of 22.3%) 390 2460 761.9
Transited 24% (of 22.3%) 7 2555 394.8
4) Independent 42%
Censored 28.2% (of 42%) 30 750 235
Died There 60.8 % (of 42%) 0 4470 973.1
Transited 11% (of 42%) 14 2555 402.9
†Hospital Stays are coded as a living arrangement exclusively for
those individuals who entered a hospital and died there, or, entered
a hospital and were still there (i.e., censored) in 1991.
‡Zeroes indicate death in the same month.
Table 2: Mothers
Living Arrangement Per cent Min Max Average
1) Hospital Stay† 6.3%
Censored 8.3% (of 6.3%) 120 200 200
Died There 91.7% (of 6.3%) 360 3060 663.8
2) Nursing Home 31.3%
Censored 31.5% (of 31.3%) 60 660 281.6
Died There 58.2% (of 31.3%) 0‡ 9090 1265.2
Transited 10.3% (of 31.3%) 2 730 144.6
3) Cohabitation 37.1%
Censored 39.9% (of 37.1%) 30 630 262
Died There 40.3% (of 37.1%) 360 10380 1414.1
Transited 20.4% of (37.1%) 3 5475 1012.8
4) Independent 24.4%
Censored 38.1% (of 24.4%) 30 960 274
Died There 37.4% (of 24.4%) 390 9480 1645
Transited 24.5% (of 24.4%) 21 5475 573.1
†Hospital Stays are coded as a living arrangement exclusively for
those individuals who entered a hospital and died there, or, entered
a hospital and were still there (i.e., censored) in 1991.
‡Zeroes indicate death in the same month.
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Table 3: Variables Description
Demographic information
Mother Dummy variable: 1 for mothers
NumChild Number of child
Rural Dummy variable: 1 if married
Married Dummy variable: 1 if married
Wealth
Own Home Dummy variable: 1 if owns home
Health: diﬃculties with Activities of Daily Living (ADL)
Eating Dummy variable: 1 if diﬃculties with eating alone
Walking Dummy variable: 1 if diﬃculties with walking
Hearing Dummy variable: 1 if diﬃculties with hearing
Seeing Dummy variable: 1 if diﬃculties with seeing
Think Dummy variable: 1 if diﬃculties with thinking
Health: illnesses
Heart Dummy variable: 1 if heart problems
Angina Dummy variable: 1 if angina problems
Kidney Dummy variable: 1 if kidney problems
Contbow Dummy variable: 1 if problems controlling bowels
Stroke Dummy variable: 1 if individual had a stroke
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Table 4: Summary statistics at times of transition
From: Transition to:
Independent Nursing home Cohabitation Death
N=932 N=291 N=283 N=240
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Demographic information
Mother 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.34 0.48
NumChild 4.15 2.71 3.69 2.25 4.69 2.88 4.06 2.81
Rural 0.34 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
Age 78.97 7.81 80.94 7.53 77.81 8.14 79.30 7.15
Married 0.45 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.73 0.45
Wealth
Own Home 0.64 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.75 0.43
Health: diﬃculties with Activities of Daily Living (ADL)
Eating 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.34 0.48
Walking 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.51 0.50
Hearing 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.35 0.48
Seeing 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45
Think 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.34 0.48
Health: illnesses
Heart 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.47 0.50
Angina 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44
Kidney 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.35
Contbow 0.22 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.09 0.28
Stroke 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46
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Table 4: cont’d
From: Transition to:
Cohabitation Independent Nursing home Death
N=300 N=11 N=44 N=125
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Demographic information
Mother 0.68 0.47 0.54 0.52 0.68 0.47 0.62 0.49
NumChild 4.79 2.98 3.00 1.90 4.18 2.07 4.94 3.03
Rural 0.34 0.47 0.18 0.40 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Age 79.76 8.33 77.92 6.68 80.34 8.83 82.34 7.66
Married 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.46
Wealth
Own Home 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.45 0.50 0.64 0.48
Health: diﬃculties with Activities of Daily Living (ADL)
Eating 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.47 0.23 0.42 0.40 0.49
Walking 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.52 0.32 0.47 0.50 0.50
Hearing 0.35 0.48 0.18 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48
Seeing 0.36 0.48 0.09 0.30 0.27 0.45 0.38 0.49
Think 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.52 0.36 0.49 0.42 0.49
Health: illnesses
Heart 0.40 0.50 0.27 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.50 0.50
Angina 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.40 0.20 0.41 0.29 0.45
Kidney 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.34
Contbow 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.47 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.26
Stroke 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.44 0.36 0.48
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Table 4: cont’d
From: Transition to:
Nursing home Cohabitation Independent Death
N=326 N=12 N=15 N=189
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
Demographic information
Mother 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.62 0.49
NumChild 3.75 2.24 5.58 4.01 2.87 1.73 3.76 2.11
Rural 0.34 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.20 0.41 0.33 0.47
Age 82.86 7.89 80.72 6.77 77.57 8.26 84.22 7.68
Married 0.31 0.46 0.08 0.29 0.53 0.52 0.33 0.47
Wealth
Own Home 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.67 0.49 0.54 0.50
Health: diﬃculties with Activities of Daily Living (ADL)
Eating 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.45 0.27 0.46 0.30 0.46
Walking 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.50
Hearing 0.37 0.48 0.58 0.51 0.33 0.49 0.39 0.49
Seeing 0.31 0.46 0.08 0.29 0.47 0.52 0.37 0.48
Think 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.73 0.46 0.43 0.50
Health: illnesses
Heart 0.40 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.60 0.51 0.46 0.50
Angina 0.20 0.40 0.42 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.20 0.40
Kidney 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.33
Contbow 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.39 0.33 0.48 0.06 0.24
Stroke 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.50
Table 5: Living Arrangment Dynamics I
Age dependence (γb1) - All States
Base Mixed
Independent 0.22** 0.34**
(0.01) (0.01)
Cohabitation 0.03** 0.12**
(0.01) (0.02)
Nursing Home 0.03** 0.13**
(0.01) (0.02)
NOTE: Standard Errors in Parentheses
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Living Arrangment Dynamics II
Duration dependence (γbe0 )
Independent Cohabitation Nursing Home Death
Base Mixed Base Mixed Base Mixed Base Mixed
Independent -0.08** -0.13** -0.10** -0.11** -0.10** -0.14**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cohabitation -2.71** -2.63** 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05*
(1.08) (1.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Nursing Home -3.66** -3.57** -0.65** -0.58* -0.00 0.02
(1.11) (1.09) (0.36) (0.36) (0.02) (0.03)
NOTE: Standard Errors in Parentheses
** (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates - Markov Model
State of origin: Destination State
Independent Nursing Home Cohabitation. Death
Base Mixed Base Mixed Base Mixed
Wealth and Demographics
Constant -22.40** -32.49** -20.38** -29.90** -20.08** -29.44**
(0.66) (1.42) (0.57) (1.32) (0.58) (1.33)
Mother 0.35** 0.38** 0.31** 0.31* -0.29* -0.30*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15)
NumChild -0.04 -0.04 0.10** 0.11** 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Rural 0.33** 0.42** 0.06 0.17 -0.15 -0.14
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18)
Married 0.68** 0.74** -0.11 -0.05 1.73** 1.85**
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Own Home -0.32** -0.51** 0.07 -0.09 0.17 -0.01
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19)
Health
Eating -0.15 -0.10 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.12
(0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21)
Walking 0.17 0.28 -0.31** -0.15 0.34** 0.42**
(0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19)
Hearing -0.54** -0.84** -1.01** -1.25** -0.42** -0.65**
(0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
Seeing -0.23 -0.29* 0.17 0.12 -0.28* -0.28
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18)
Think 0.39** 0.49** -0.18 -0.08 -0.17 -0.14
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Heart -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 0.34** 0.43**
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
Angina -0.31* -0.39* 0.08 -0.01 0.17 0.01
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21)
Kidney 0.25 0.47 0.05 0.32 0.72** 1.08**
(0.22) (0.31) (0.22) (0.31) (0.19) (0.32)
Contbow 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11 -1.36** -1.46**
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) (0.25)
Stroke 0.49** 0.61** -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 -0.17
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
NOTE: Standard Errors in Parentheses
** (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.
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Table 7: cont’d
State of origin: Destination State
Cohabitation Nursing Home Independent Death
Base Mixed Base Mixed Base Mixed
Wealth and Demographics
Constant -2.81** -10.20** -2.28** -9.96** -3.65** -11.26**
(0.90) (1.40) (1.24) (1.68) (0.84) (1.36)
Mother -1.08** -1.00** -0.90 -0.75 -0.68** -0.50**
(0.37) (0.41) (0.66) (0.67) (0.21) (0.26)
NumChild -0.07 -0.06 -0.30* -0.29* 0.00 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04)
Rural 0.21 0.24 -0.26 -0.22 -0.38* -0.49*
(0.36) (0.40) (0.86) (0.87) (0.21) (0.26)
Married -1.31** -0.97* -0.13 0.07 0.16 0.55**
(0.58) (0.59) (0.83) (0.84) (0.24) (0.28)
Own Home -0.33 -0.71* -0.17 -0.41 0.21 -0.09
(0.35) (0.38) (0.67) (0.68) (0.21) (0.25)
Health
Eating -0.04 0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.40
(0.55) (0.54) (0.93) (0.92) (0.29) (0.33)
Walking -0.20 -0.05 0.24 0.36 0.19 0.38
(0.52) (0.51) (0.81) (0.80) (0.29) (0.32)
Hearing -0.40 -0.76* -0.92 -1.21 0.09 -0.22
(0.38) (0.43) (0.87) (0.89) (0.22) (0.28)
Seeing -0.63* -0.62 -1.35 -1.44 -0.21 -0.34
(0.39) (0.43) (1.09) (1.12) (0.21) (0.26)
Think 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.31 0.13 0.11
(0.33) (0.36) (0.64) (0.66) (0.20) (0.24)
Heart -1.08** -1.31** -0.15 -0.38 0.26 0.05
(0.52) (0.55) (0.93) (0.92) (0.24) (0.29)
Angina 0.37 0.26 -0.05 -0.12 -0.23 -0.38
(0.59) (0.61) (1.03) (1.02) (0.27) (0.31)
Kidney -1.67** -1.43* 0.13 0.30 0.22 0.64*
(0.81) (0.86) (1.21) (1.26) (0.30) (0.38)
Contbow 0.37 0.25 1.04 0.93 -0.65* -0.92**
(0.51) (0.56) (0.77) (0.77) (0.38) (0.43)
Stroke -0.27 -0.36 † † 0.09 -0.02
(0.40) (0.41) † † (0.22) (0.25)
NOTE: Standard Errors in Parentheses
** (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.
† no variation in explanatory variable
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Table 7: cont’d
State of origin: Destination State
Nursing Home Independent Cohabitation. Death
Base Mixed Base Mixed Base Mixed
Wealth and Demographics
Constant -4.30** -12.84** -6.87** -15.52** -3.84** -12.48**
(1.32) (1.85) (1.43) (1.93) (0.84) (1.52)
Mother -0.79 -0.77 -0.10 -0.01 -0.45** -0.46**
(0.57) (0.60) (0.69) (0.73) (0.18) (0.23)
NumChild -0.32* -0.34* 0.22* 0.25** -0.01 -0.00
(0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05)
Rural -0.66 -0.69 0.24 0.11 -0.10 -0.19
(0.68) (0.70) (0.67) (0.71) (0.17) (0.26)
Married 0.78 1.14* -1.80 -1.60 -0.13 0.12
(0.59) (0.61) (1.14) (1.16) (0.18) (0.24)
Own Home 0.72 0.60 0.24 0.06 0.09 -0.02
(0.63) (0.66) (0.67) (0.70) (0.17) (0.22)
Health
Eating -0.34 -0.43 -0.11 -0.23 0.44** 0.33
(0.75) (0.77) (0.81) (0.89) (0.20) (0.29)
Walking -0.40 -0.17 0.41 0.71 -0.03 0.32
(0.68) (0.70) (0.78) (0.82) (0.18) (0.27)
Hearing -0.46 -0.83 1.04 0.65 -0.21 -0.41*
(0.61) (0.62) (0.71) (0.72) (0.17) (0.24)
Seeing 0.48 0.32 -2.23** -2.38** -0.14 -0.35
(0.56) (0.57) (1.16) (1.17) (0.17) (0.25)
Think 1.04* 1.12* -0.50 -0.47 -0.06 -0.10
(0.62) (0.64) (0.71) (0.73) (0.16) (0.20)
Heart 0.41 0.45 -0.77 -0.87 0.41** 0.65**
(0.69) (0.71) (0.77) (0.80) (0.17) (0.23)
Angina 1.01 0.89 1.47* 1.37* 0.09 -0.09
(0.70) (0.74) (0.80) (0.83) (0.21) (0.27)
Kidney -0.73 -0.55 -0.34 0.01 0.70** 1.02**
(1.12) (1.34) (1.24) (1.26) (0.25) (0.39)
Contbow 1.02* 0.84 1.06 0.98 -0.49 -0.72*
(0.60) (0.64) (0.86) (0.89) (0.31) (0.40)
Stroke -0.07 -0.06 0.40 0.51 0.40** 0.56**
(0.57) (0.58) (0.68) (0.69) (0.16) (0.20)
NOTE: Standard Errors in Parentheses
** (*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.
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Figure 1- Living Arrangement Histories for Fathers 
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Figure 2 - Living Arrangement Histories for Mothers 
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